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Abstract
Comparativism is the view that comparative confidences (e.g., being more
confident that P than that Q) are more fundamental than degrees of belief
(e.g., believing that P with some strength x). In this paper, I outline the
basis for a new, non-probabilistic version of comparativism inspired by a
suggestion made by Frank Ramsey in ‘Probability and Partial Belief’. I
show how, and to what extent, ‘Ramseyan comparativism’ might be used
to weaken the (unrealistically strong) probabilistic coherence conditions
that comparativism traditionally relies on.
1. Introduction
Beliefs come in degrees, or so it seems. Assuming they do, one important ques-
tion concerns the basis of their numerical representation. It is typical to rep-
resent the varying strengths with which propositions might be believed using
percentages, or real values between 0 and 1, or with intervals thereof. Moreover,
it’s typical to assume that these numbers encode more than merely ordinal in-
formation. For instance, it seems that we can meaningfully talk about intervals
of strengths of belief: an agent—let’s call her α—might believe one proposition
much more than she believes another, or she might believe it just a little more.
Likewise for ratios: if α is 50% confident that the coin she flips will land heads,
then most of us would be happy to say that she has half as much confidence in
that event than she has in the coin landing either heads or tails. And, if she’s
even a little bit rational, then she’ll probably be at least twice as confident that
it’ll land heads on the next toss than that it’ll land heads consistently on the
next several tosses.
There is, in other words, a widespread prima facie commitment in our un-
derstanding of degrees of belief that they can be measured on a ratio scale,
or something much like it. Given this, we’ll assume for the remainder of this
paper that the numbers we use to represent the strengths of our beliefs can, at
least in principle, carry cardinal (read: at least ratio and therefore also interval)
information. Supposing that’s correct, it’s just the sort of thing that ought to
be explained by any adequate account of what degrees of belief are. We don’t
get to posit cardinality for free—α’s doxastic states don’t come with little num-
bers attached to them, and they don’t literally stand in numerical relationships
with one another. Rather, they must have some non-numerical structure that
is in some way similar to and hence representable by the real values in the unit
interval, and in particular such that both the ordinal and relevant cardinal prop-
erties of and relations between those numbers represent something doxastically
meaningful. That much is clear enough—the hard part consists in saying exactly
what that structure is.
So how is it that we manage to get from the purely non-numerical stuff in our
heads through to numerical representations of our doxastic states that encode
interesting cardinal information? A few answers to this question have been sug-
gested. One long-standing tradition seeks to explain where the numbers come
from and how they get their meaning by considering how beliefs interact with
preferences (e.g., Ramsey 1931). Others have tried to extract numerical repre-
sentations out of comparative expectations, a special kind of non-propositional
comparative attitude (e.g., Suppes and Zanotti 1976). Still other potential ap-
proaches have yet to be explored. For instance, if you like the idea that degrees
of belief are really just outright beliefs about objective probabilities, then you
might think that whatever cardinality they possess is derivative upon the car-
dinal information possessed by those probabilities—wherever that comes from.
I’m inclined to think that each of these possibilities are worth considering
seriously; at least, none of them seem to me either obviously correct, or irre-
trievably hopeless. I have argued elsewhere that the connection with preferences
is one promising avenue to explore (Elliott 2019a). But in this paper I want to
focus on an entirely different kind of approach: comparativism.
For the sake of concreteness, I’ll take comparativism to be the view that
the facts about an agent’s degrees of belief supervene on, and indeed hold in
virtue of, the facts about what we’ll call her confidence comparisons. These are
purely ordinal comparative doxastic states such as being more confident that
P than that Q, being equally confident that P as that Q, or being at least as
confident that P as that Q.1 With that as their starting point, comparativists
tend to see degrees of belief and the numerical representations thereof as a kind
of theoretical tool, a way to represent and reason about sufficiently coherent
systems of comparative confidence. Or to put that another way: the numbers
we use to represent our beliefs ultimately describe a purely ordinal structure
imposed over a set of propositions by our confidence comparisons, when those
comparisons satisfy some minimum threshold of coherence.
On the face of it, comparativism might seem to struggle with providing any
plausible explanation of the possibility of cardinal information. After all, indi-
vidual confidence comparisons contain no more than purely ordinal information,
so how could a system composed of nothing more than such comparisons possess
anything more than that?2 Nevertheless, comparativists have what is by now a
standard explanation of how cardinality can be generated out of nothing more
1 It won’t matter too much for what I have to say exactly how we define ‘comparativism’,
and there of course are many other ways to precisify the general kind of idea that I’m referring
to. Most actual comparativists have taken a view which is at least in the vicinity of what I
below characterise as probabilistic comparativism; e.g., (de Finetti 1931), (Koopman 1940),
(Savage 1954, Ch. 3), (Fine 1973, 68ff), (Hawthorne 2016) and (Stefa´nsson 2016, 2018); com-
parativist theories along these lines are also discussed in (Fishburn 1986) and (Krantz et al.
1971, 200). In some cases, a comparativist might focus on quarternary confidence comparisons
(e.g., being more confident that P given Q than that R given S), rather than on binary com-
parisons like those I’ve described here. For the sake of brevity, I’ve limited my discussion to
the relatively simple views which consider only binary confidence comparisons. Nevertheless,
each of the main points of discussion in §§3–§4 have fairly straightforward analogues for the
typical case of the quarternary comparativist.
2 For a recent complaint along just these lines, see (Meacham and Weisberg 2011, 659).
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than ordinal confidence comparisons. By drawing on a well-worn analogy with
the measurement of mass, length, and other extensive quantities, comparativists
have managed to set down conditions (or axioms) under which meaningful car-
dinal information might be extracted out of a system of confidence comparisons.
That is the current state of play. However, the axioms to which compara-
tivists typically appeal when addressing this kind of challenge are quite strong
indeed. Essentially, they impose a comparative variety of probabilistic (and
hence logical) coherence on the agents’ confidence comparisons. And this is a key
limitation with the view in its most typical contemporary form: it lacks an ade-
quate account of how ordinary agents—who do not live up to the very strict stan-
dards of probabilistic coherence—might nevertheless have beliefs which carry
genuine cardinal information. Consequently, in this paper I want to explore
whether, and how, the standard ‘probabilistic’ axioms might be weakened, while
maintaining the same basic strategy for extracting cardinality out of a system
of comparative confidences.
Let me say that again, for emphasis: the goal here is to explore whether,
and to what extent, the usual probabilistic axioms can be weakened. This is a
question of interest to proponents and opponents of comparativism alike, and
for those who might be on the fence. I stress however that my results are formal,
not evaluative. The present paper is not intended to be a defence of compar-
ativism. (It would be woefully inadequate if so!) An evaluation of the overall
merits and demerits of the comparativists’ view is well beyond the scope of this
discussion, and I won’t try to address the tricky empirical question of whether
and to what extent the weakened axioms are satisfied or even approximated by
ordinary agents. Still less is this a paper on what our comparative confidences
should be like, so I will not have anything much to say about how Ramseyan
comparativism relates to arguments for probabilism.
I will begin my discussion by reviewing the standard account of how mass
can be measured on a ratio scale, and how probabilistic comparativism posits
an essentially similar process for the measurement of belief (§§2–3). Following
that, I’ll discuss in a little more detail the motivations for seeking more general
axioms under which cardinality can be extracted out of a system of confidence
comparisons (§4). Finally, I will show that the axioms of what I’ll call probabilis-
tic comparativism can be weakened to a significant extent—though, not without
limits. I will do this by developing what I call Ramseyan comparativism (§5).
Moreover, I will show that the Ramseyan axioms on confidence comparisons are
in one important respect maximally weak: inasmuch as comparativists want to
retain the analogy with the measurement of mass as it’s usually understood, the
Ramseyan axioms are as weak as they come.
2. The Measurement of Mass
Let a and b be any two concrete objects you like, and compare:
Ordinal. a is more massive than b
Cardinal. a is twice as massive as b
Cardinal obviously contains more information than Ordinal, and that infor-
mation has to come from somewhere. Yet masses don’t come with little numbers
attached to them. Whatever it is that explains the extra information in Cardi-
nal must ultimately be non-numerical in nature. So how can we get from the
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non-numerical facts on the ground through to numerical masses that encode
interesting cardinal information?
The representational theory of measurement gives us a plausible answer.3
First, note that Cardinal is true (roughly) if and only if, if you were to take
two disjoint objects each as massive as b (call them b1 and b2, b’s duplicates)
and join them together, then the resulting object would be just as massive as a.
Call the operation of joining objects together concatenation; we assume that no
mass is gained or lost in the act of concatenating. Given this, it’s plausible that
there’s nothing more to the truth of a claim like Cardinal than what we’ve
just said—that is, ‘a is twice as massive as b’ just means something roughly
to the effect of ‘a is as massive as the concatenation of two duplicates of b.’
By reference, then, to purely ordinal comparisons between duplicates and the
concatenations thereof, we’ve been able to give straightforward non-numerical
meaning to Cardinal.
And we can easily generalise this idea to explain other rational ratio com-
parisons. For positive integers n,m, say that a is n/m times as massive as b
whenever there’s some object c such that
1. a is as massive as the concatenation of n duplicates of c, and
2. b is as massive as the concatenation of m duplicates of c.
Now let x designate c’s mass in whatever units you like—let’s say slugs (∼14.6 kg).
Intuitively, a must then have a mass of n · x slugs, and b must have a mass of
m · x slugs. Hence, a is n/m times as massive as b. Indeed, with a little bit more
work, we can generalise the idea even further to explain arbitrary real ratio
comparisons. However, for the sake of simplicity we’ll stick with rational ratios
throughout this discussion.
Hiding in the background is a crucial empirical assumption: that the opera-
tion of concatenation behaves as a kind of non-numerical analogue of addition.
We rely on exactly this assumption to move from, e.g., ‘a is as massive as the
concatenation of n duplicates of an object with a mass of x slugs’ to ‘a has
a mass of n · x slugs’—that is, we assume that the mass of a concatenation is
just the sum of the masses of the concatenands. (Imagine if, instead, concate-
nation behaved like quaddition: whenever you concatenate up to 57 duplicates
together, things are as usual; but concatenate more and the result is always as
massive as 5 duplicates. We could have then used concatenations to define our
way up to one object’s being 57 times as massive than another, but no further.)
Fortunately, the analogy between concatenation and addition is quite close.
Where
a %m b iff a is at least as massive as b,
a ∼m b iff a is exactly as massive as b,
a⊕ b = the concatenation of a and b,
then it’s plausible that %m is transitive and complete, and ∼m is its symmetric
part. Furthermore, ⊕ behaves with respect to %m a lot like + behaves with
respect to ≥: for all disjoint objects a, b, c,
1. a⊕ b %m b
2. a⊕ b ∼m b⊕ a
3 The locus classicus for this theory is (Krantz et al. 1971).
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3. a⊕ (b⊕ c) ∼m (a⊕ b)⊕ c
4. a %m b iff a⊕ c %m b⊕ c
Now compare these with the following properties of + in relation to ≥, where
n and m are non-negative real numbers:
1. n+m ≥ m
2. n+m = m+ n
3. n+ (m+ k) = (n+m) + k
4. n ≥ m iff, for any k, n+ k ≥ m+ k
Indeed, if we posit a rich enough space of concrete objects and make one further
‘Archimedean’ assumption—roughly: that no object is infinitely more massive
than any other—then we can say something stronger still: if O is the set of
∼m -equivalence classes of concrete objects and R+ the positive reals, then the
relational system 〈O,%m ,⊕〉 has essentially the same structure as 〈R+,≥,+〉.
Thus, we can assign a number to each object in such a way that %m is repre-
sented by ≥, and ⊕ is represented by +. And with that in hand, we can start
to define up ratios of masses, numerical differences in mass, ratios of differ-
ences in mass, and so on. In other words, we have all the basic resources needed
to explain how numerical representations of mass manage to carry all sorts of
interesting cardinal information.
The upshot: numerical masses represent a fully non-numerical system of or-
dinal mass comparisons which have an ‘additive’ structure over concatenations.
We’re justified in treating ratios of masses as meaningful because there exists
an operation on objects that is intuitively and formally like ‘adding’ masses to-
gether. And we can apply the same basic idea outlined here to account for the
measurement of other (extensive) quantities: a is twice as long as b iff a is as
long as two length-duplicates of b laid end-to-end; a has twice the volume of b
iff a has the same volume as two volume-duplicates of b joined together; and an
event e1 has twice the duration of e2 iff e1 can be split into two disjoint events
with the same duration as e2.
To apply the same idea to the measurement of beliefs, comparativists have
therefore historically sought an operation on the relata of confidence compar-
isons (i.e., propositions) that behaves, with respect to those comparisons, sim-
ilarly enough to addition to justify treating it as a non-numerical analogue
thereof. As Krantz et al. put it, the strategy is ‘to treat the assignment of
[subjective] probabilities as a measurement problem of the same fundamental
character as the measurement of, e.g., mass or duration’ (1971, p. 200). So let’s
see how that plays out in practice.
3. Probabilistic Comparativism
In this section I’ll provide an overview of probabilistic comparativism. I’ll be-
gin by laying out some basic notation and assumptions (§3.1), followed by the
mathematical underpinnings of the view (§3.2). Finally, I’ll define two specific
varieties of probabilistic comparativism—one ‘precise’ (§3.3), and the other ‘im-
precise’ (§3.4).
3.1 Notation and assumptions
Let α be an arbitrary thinking subject whose beliefs we are trying to represent. I
will assume that the propositions regarding which α has beliefs can be modelled
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as subsets of some space of logically possible worlds, Ω. By ‘logically possible’, I
mean no more than that the worlds are closed under a consequence relation at
least as strong as that of classical propositional logic. So, you can assume that Ω
includes metaphysically or even epistemically impossible worlds, if that’s what
floats your boat—as long as the worlds are classically logically consistent. (I’ll
talk more about this assumption in §4.)
Next, let B ⊆ ℘(Ω) denote that set of propositions regarding which α has
beliefs. Without loss of generality, I’ll assume throughout that B is a Boolean
algebra of sets on Ω. So, B contains at least Ω and ∅, and it’s closed under
relative complements and binary intersections/unions. I’ll also assume through-
out that B is finite. Doing this will simplify much of the ensuing discussion and
formalities.4
I’ll assume that α’s full system of confidence comparisons can be modelled
with a single binary relation % defined over B, where
P % Q iff α believes P at least as much as she believes Q
I’ll refer to % as α’s confidence ranking. Consequently, where  and ∼ stand for
the comparatives more probable and equally probable respectively, I am in effect
assuming that
P ∼ Q iff (P % Q) & (Q % P )
P  Q iff (P % Q) &¬(Q % P )
Nothing about this last assumption should be treated as obvious or trivial. For
example, α might be at least as confident in P as in Q without being more
confident in P than in Q, or without being equally confident in P as in Q.
Nevertheless, it will simplify the discussion, and nothing of great importance
will hang on it.
Finally, where a function Cr assigns real numbers to the propositions in B,
I’ll say that Cr almost agrees with % iff, for all P,Q ∈ B,
P % Q only if Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q);
and we’ll say that Cr agrees with % just in case
P % Q iff Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q).
For ease of expression, I’ll treat agreement (but not almost agreement) as sym-
metric: % agrees with Cr just in case Cr agrees with %.
3.2 Agreeing with probabilities
Any Cr that agrees with confidence comparisons % is ipso facto at least an
ordinal-scale representation of %. Our task now is to lay out axioms under
which such a function can be said to also carry cardinal information. This is
where probabilities come in handy:
4 The finitude of B plays a minor (simplifying) role in relation to Theorem 1. We can do
without it if we instead make use of a more complicated version of Definition 5. The finiteness
assumption also plays a role in the existence proof of Theorem 2. Where B is uncountable,
additional ‘continuity’ assumptions can be placed on the comparative confidence relation which
will guarantee the existence of the relevant type of representation. See (Evren and Ok 2011)
for discussion on these types of conditions.
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Definition 1. Cr : B 7→ R is a probability function iff, ∀P,Q ∈ B,
1. Cr(Ω) = 1,
2. Cr(P ) ≥ 0, and
3. If P ∩Q = ∅, then Cr(P ∪Q) = Cr(P ) + Cr(Q)
It follows immediately from the third criterion that if some probability function—
any probability function—agrees with %, then the union of disjoint sets is to
% just as ⊕ is to %m , or as + is to ≥. Great! That’s exactly the kind of thing
needed for the analogy with the measurement of mass to hold water.
Moreover, we have known for a long time the exact conditions under which a
confidence ranking will agree with some probability function on B. The following
five axioms are individually necessary and jointly sufficient (see Scott 1964). For
all P,Q,R ∈ B,
Completeness. P % Q or Q % P
Preorder. (i) P % P , and (ii) if P % Q and Q % R, then P % R
Non-Triviality. Ω  ∅
Non-Negativity. P % ∅
Scott’s Axiom. Where 1P denotes the indicator function of P , (Pi)
n
i=1 and
(Qi)
n
i=1 are finite sequences of propositions, and (ki)
n
i=1 is a finite sequence
of natural numbers, then if
1.
∑n
i=1 ki · 1Pi(ω) =
∑n
i=1 ki · 1Qi(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, and
2. Pi % Qi, for i = 1, . . . , n− 1,
then Qn % Pn
Call the conjunction of the above five axioms the Complete Package.5 Com-
parativists have frequently suggested that, when % conforms to the Complete
Package, beliefs can be measured on a ratio scale with the union of disjoint
sets playing the role of concatenation (e.g., Fine 1973, 68ff; Stefa´nsson 2016,
2018).
It is possible to say something a little more general than this, though, and
doing so will be useful in demonstrating a general continuity between probabilis-
tic comparativism and the Ramseyan comparativisms that I’ll develop below.
First, note that if Cr is a probability function, then if Cr(P ∩ Q) = 0, then
Cr(P ∪Q) = Cr(P ) + Cr(Q). That is to say: probability functions are also ad-
ditive with respect to the union of what we’ll call pseudodisjoint propositions,
where P and Q are pseudodisjoint for α just in case she has no confidence in
their intersection. Or, more precisely,
Definition 2. For all P ∈ B, P is:
1. minimal iff Q % P for all Q ∈ B,
2. maximal iff P % Q for all Q ∈ B,
5 In the context of the other axioms, Preorder is redundant, and Scott’s Axiom is
equivalent to the slightly weaker formulation found in (Scott 1964) (see Harrison-Trainor
et al. 2016). I’ve done it this way to make later discussions easier.
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3. middling iff P is neither minimal nor maximal
Definition 3. P ⊆ B is a set of pseudodisjoint propositions iff, for any minimal
Q and any P? ⊆ P such that |P?| ≥ 2, ⋂P? ∼ Q; furthermore, proposi-
tions P1, . . . , Pn are pairwise pseudodisjoint iff there’s a set of pseudodisjoint
propositions P such that P1, . . . , Pn ∈ P
Assuming that α has exactly zero confidence in P whenever P is minimal,
Definition 3 plausibly characterise in comparativist terms what it is for α to
believe that at most one proposition from P1, . . . , Pn is true.
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With all that in hand, we can note that the Complete Package implies
that % is ‘Archimedean’—roughly: no proposition is infinitely more probable
than any other—and furthermore, where propositions P,Q,R are pairwise pseu-
dodisjoint,
1. (P ∪Q) % Q
2. (P ∪Q) ∼ Q ∪ P )
3. (P ∪ (Q ∪R)) ∼ ((P ∪Q) ∪R)
4. P % Q iff (P ∪R) % (Q ∪R)
Again, this is exactly what comparativists need to draw the analogy with the
measurement of mass. So let’s turn the foregoing mathematical points into a
philosophical theory.
3.3 Precise probabilistic comparativism
Assuming that Cr agrees with α’s confidence ranking, say henceforth that Cr
constitutes a fully adequate model of α’s beliefs whenever
α believes P n/m times as much as she believes Q iff Cr(P ) = n
m
· Cr(Q)
I assume that full adequacy is worth striving for—after all, most theorists will
be happy to make both of the following kinds of inferences:
1. α believes P to degree x, and Q to degree y
2. x = n · y
∴ α believes P n times as much as she believes Q
and in the other direction,
1. α believes P n times as much as Q
2. α believes P to degree y
∴ α believes Q to degree x = n · y
Only full adequacy licenses inferences in both of these directions, and so I take
it that full adequacy stands as an important desideratum for any comparativist
theory. With that said, we can also say that Cr is L-to-R adequate iff the left-
to-right direction of the above biconditional holds, and R-to-L adequate iff the
right-to-left direction holds. A comparativist may well want to reject full ade-
quacy in favour of mere L-to-R or R-to-L adequacy, provided that the rejection
6 Definition 3 implies that every singleton set {P} ∈ B is trivially a ‘set of pseudodisjoint
propositions’. This is a feature, not a bug. The rather tortured definition will be useful later
when we generalise away from probability functions.
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is well-motivated and they are able to explain away any intuitions in support of
full adequacy. (I’ll say a little more about this in §5.3.)
Next, let precise probabilistic comparativism denote any comparativist theory
that’s committed to the following conditional:
Precise Probabilistic Comparativism. If Cr is the unique probability func-
tion that agrees with α’s confidence ranking, then Cr is a fully adequate
model of α’s beliefs
Note the stated requirement that the probability function be unique. This is
needed to avoid contradiction: for any non-trivial algebra B, there will always be
some collection of probability functions on B that agree with one and the same
confidence ranking—and since any two probability functions on the same domain
will disagree on at least some ratios, any inference from ‘Cr(Q) = n/m · Cr(Q)’
to ‘α believes P n/m times as much as Q’ will be valid only when the Cr is
unique in the relevant sense. In short, R-to-L adequacy presupposes uniqueness,
which in turn requires further constraints on %.
There are multiple ways to ensure uniqueness. Of particular note is the
following, which Stefa´nsson (2016, 2018; cf. also Suppes 1969, 6–7; Savage 1954)
uses to ensure uniqueness in his recent defences of probabilistic comparativism:
Continuity. For all non-minimal P,Q, there are P ′, Q′ such that P ∼ P ′,
Q ∼ Q′, and P ′ and Q′ are each the union of some subset of a finite set of
disjoint propositions {R1, . . . , Rn} such that Ri ∼ Rj for i, j = 1, . . . , n
The interested reader can see (Krantz et al. 1971, §5.2) and (Fishburn 1986) for
other conditions sufficient to ensure uniqueness.
Now, probabilistic comparativism clearly has resources to put forward an ac-
count of how a system of confidence comparisons might end up carrying cardinal
information, in the event that % satisfies the requisite axioms. In particular, con-
sider the following principle, which in essence is just the comparative probability
version of how we defined rational ratio comparisons for mass earlier in §2:7
General Ratio Principle. α believes P n/m times as much as Q if
1. For 0 < n ≤ m, there are m non-minimal, equiprobable pairwise pseu-
dodisjoint propositions R1, . . . , Rm such that Q ∼ (R1 ∪ · · · ∪Rm) and
P ∼ (R1 ∪ · · · ∪Rn); or
2. α believes P n′/m′ times as much as R, and believes R n′′/m′′ times as
much as Q, where n/m = n′ · n′′/m′ ·m′′
So, for instance, suppose that Q∩Q′ is minimal. Then, α will take P to be twice
as probable as Q inasmuch as Q ∼ Q′ and (Q∪Q′) ∼ P . In this case, Q and Q′
are acting as ‘duplicates’ of one another, and Q ∪Q′ is their ‘concatenation’.
3.4 Imprecise probabilistic comparativism
Say that Cr confirms the General Ratio Principle (GRP) just in case, whenever
that principle implies that P is believed n/m times as much as Q, then Cr(P ) =
7 The first clause of the General Ratio Principle is a close relative of Stefa´nsson’s (2018)
‘Ratio Principle.’ The second (inductive) clause is new—in the context of a condition like
Continuity it’s redundant, but see §4 for it put to work.
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n/m · Cr(Q); otherwise, it disconfirms the GRP. It is easy to check that if any
probability function almost agrees with %, and ∅ is minimal, then that function
will confirm the GRP. This means that it’s possible to extend the account of
ratio comparisons just given to incomplete confidence rankings.
For ordinary agents, the Completeness axiom is widely considered highly
implausible. Consider the following, adapted from (Fishburn 1986):
P = The global population in 2100 will be greater than 13 billion
Q = The next card drawn from this old and incomplete deck will be a heart
Are you more confident that P than that Q, or less, or just as confident in
either? It’s not clear that there must be a fact of the matter. Similar examples
abound.8
There’s a natural way of dealing with incompleteness to which comparativists
can (and do) appeal. Where F is any set of real-valued functions on B, say this
time that the set F agrees with % just in case for all relevant P,Q,
P % Q iff ∀Cr ∈ F : Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q)
The idea behind a set-of-functions model is to recapture the structure of the
confidence ranking by doing something like supervaluating over the functions in
F—only what’s common to every such function is treated as having representa-
tive import. If P and Q are incomparable in terms of relative confidence, then
F will contain at least one pair of probability functions that disagree on the
relative ordering of P and Q—hence, we still manage to ‘numerically’ represent
incomplete % rankings.
Alon and Lehrer (2014) have shown that a set of probability functions agrees
with % just in case the latter satisfies the Complete Package minus the Com-
pleteness axiom (henceforth: the Non-Complete Package). Furthermore,
while there will often be more than one set of probability functions F that agrees
with %, the union of all such sets will always agree with %. In sum: whenever %
satisfies the Non-Complete Package, there’s guaranteed to be a unique set
of probability functions that agrees with % and which is maximal with respect
to inclusion.
Consequently, if we extend the definitions of full / L-to-R / R-to-L adequacy
in the natural way (i.e., by inserting ‘∀Cr ∈ F’ in the appropriate locations), we
can characterise imprecise probabilistic comparativism by its commitment to:
Imprecise Probabilistic Comparativism. If a non-empty set of probability
functionsF agrees with α’s confidence ranking andF is maximal with respect
to inclusion, then F is a fully adequate model of α’s beliefs
Imprecise probabilistic comparativism implies the precise version. More pre-
cisely, if we assume that F and Cr are essentially the same representation when-
ever F = {Cr}, then the two varieties of comparativism amount to one and the
same thing whenever exactly one probability function agrees with %.
8 You don’t have to be convinced by the example, and here is not the place for a detailed
discussion on whether we should expect ‘gaps’ in %. What matters is just that there might
be gaps, and many think that there are. Completeness may or may not be plausible for
perfectly rational agents, but since our focus is on deidealising the usual probabilistic theory
that’s neither here nor there.
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Furthermore, every Cr in a set F that agrees with % will itself almost agree
with %. So, if we also extend the definition of ‘confirms the GRP’ in the obvi-
ous way to sets of functions, it follows that if a set of probability functions F
agrees with %, then F confirms the GRP. The upshot is that both the precise
and imprecise versions of probabilistic comparativism can extract cardinality
from comparative confidences in basically the same way; the latter is a natural
generalisation of the former.
4. Why Generalise?
We’ve seen now that conformity to the Non-Complete Package is sufficient
for the union of pseudodisjoint sets to behave like addition. But it is by no means
necessary. It is possible to weaken those axioms still further while maintaining
the analogy, and I think it is of some importance for comparativism that this
can be done. In this section I’ll say why.
The basic reason is that the axioms of the Non-Complete Package are,
in conjunction, quite strong—it is not likely that they’re jointly satisfied by any
ordinary agents. Since I think it’s especially troubling, I’ll focus on one issue
in particular: in the context of the (individually rather weak) axioms Non-
Triviality and Non-Negativity, Scott’s Axiom immediately generates a
probabilistic version of the classical problems of logical omniscience. Those three
axioms entail that if P ⊆ Q and P,Q ∈ B, then Q % P . Consequently,
Logical Omniscience. If the worlds in Ω are closed under the consequence
relation ⇒, then for all P,Q ∈ B, if P ⇒ Q, then Q % P
That is, any confidence ranking that is (i) defined over propositions taken from a
space of worlds that’s closed under⇒, and (ii) agrees with a (set of) probability
function(s), will ipso facto be ‘coherent’ with respect to ⇒ in the manner just
described. In §3.1 it was assumed that⇒ is at least as strong as the consequence
relation we find in classical propositional logic, and it’s implausible that ordinary
agents’ confidence rankings are everywhere and always coherent with respect to
that logic. I’ll say more about that in a moment. But the point can also be put in
a much more general way: we are (probably) not omniscient with respect to any
very interesting logics, so unless ⇒ is extremely weak indeed, the confidence
rankings of any ordinary agents will (probably) falsify at least one of Non-
Triviality, Non-Negativity, or Scott’s Axiom.
How might a comparativist respond to this fact? Four obvious (but also
obviously non-exhaustive) options are:
1. Argue that ordinary agents’ comparative confidences do conform to the
Non-Complete Package after all, because they are probabilistically
coherent after all.
2. Argue that ordinary agents’ comparative confidences do conform to the
Non-Complete Package after all, once we define propositions over a
richer space of worlds.
3. Argue that because ordinary agents’ comparative confidences do not con-
form to the Non-Complete Package, they therefore do not ground any
cardinal information (or not the same kind of information).
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4. Accept that ordinary agents’ comparative confidences do not conform to
the Non-Complete Package, and seek weaker axioms under which car-
dinality can be extracted from comparative confidences.
The fourth seems to me clearly the best option. After all, nothing about com-
parativism per se ties it irrevocably to specifically probabilistic representations
of degrees of belief, and if more general conditions exist then it only makes sense
for comparativists to find and use them. But if you prefer one of the others, or
something else not listed, then so be it—there’s no harm in developing ideas in
many different directions. I will, however, here give some reasons to think that
the fourth option should be preferred.
Regarding the first: I will take it for granted in the following discussion that
we are not (classically) logically omniscient. “But maybe we are!”—Sure, and
I’m not unsympathetic to the idea that we ordinary agents really are proba-
bilistically coherent. But since this is usually met with an incredulous stare let’s
just move on already. The second option instead seems to be the more common
way of arguing that the Non-Complete Package can actually be satisfied
by ordinary (and ordinarily irrational) agents. As I’ve noted, if the entailment
relation ⇒ is weak enough, then logical omniscience might not look so bad. So
what would happen if we were to remove the assumption that the worlds in Ω
are closed under any interesting logic?
In a little more detail, the idea is this. If we help ourselves to a rich enough
space of possible and impossible worlds, then it’s well-known that we can con-
struct a probability function properly so-called on that enriched space that
‘mimics’ the behaviour of a non-probabilistic function defined over the smaller
space of classical possible worlds.9 So what looks like comparative confidences
that are inconsistent withNon-Triviality,Non-Negativity, and/or Scott’s
Axiom when they’re defined for propositions qua sets of possible worlds, can in
fact be re-represented using (sets of) probability functions, if we make use of
enough impossible worlds. Hence, to apply the probabilistic comparativists’ ex-
planation of cardinality to ordinary agents, we don’t need to weaken the axioms
all. We can keep the the Non-Complete Package as long as we just make
sure to use enough impossible worlds.
That seems easy enough, but I do not think that this is a viable strategy for
the comparativist to adopt. I’ll set out the reasons for this very briefly, since most
of the relevant issues are discussed at length in (Elliott 2019b). The problem is
that once Ω includes enough impossible worlds for the strategy to work (roughly:
for any impossibility, there’s an impossible world that verifies it), then most
subsets of Ω will be meaningless and consequently not representative of any
proper contents of belief. Moreover, for any meaningful subset P of Ω, none of
P ’s subsets or supersets will be meaningful, and nor will any subset of Ω \P be
meaningful. In short, having too many impossible worlds in Ω renders useless
for the purposes of comparativism any set-theoretic definition of ‘concatenation’
along the lines described in §3. Furthermore, any algebra of propositions defined
on a space of possible and impossible worlds that’s rich enough to represent
9 Where Ω is the space of classically possible worlds, B ⊆ ℘(Ω), and Cr : B 7→ [0, 1], then
if Ω+ is a rich enough extension of Ω into the space of impossible worlds, there’s a probability
function Cr+ on an algebra of sets B+ ⊆ ℘(Ω+) such that Cr+ assigns x to the subset of Ω+
that verifies ϕ iff Cr assigns x to the subset of Ω that verifies ϕ. See (Cozic 2006), (Halpern
and Pucella 2011), and (Elliott 2019b).
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the contents of belief will contain only meaningful propositions just when the
relevant space of worlds is closed under a consequence relation that is, for all
intents and purposes, at least as strong as classical propositional logic.
(Of course, comparativists don’t have to define their concatenations set-
theoretically as I have done in §3.2. But the only other place that we will plau-
sibly find the structure required to defined up an appropriate concatenation
operation is in the logical relations amongst the contents of the propositions.
That is, we could define concatenations in terms of disjunctions of inconsis-
tent contents (or disjunctions of contents whose conjunctions are minimal).
But defining the concatenation operation in this way brings us straight back to
where we started vis-a`-vis to the problem of logical omniscience, and appealing
to impossible worlds will be of absolutely no help here.)
So there’s no easy way to pursue either the first or the second route: if
you want to tie the possibility of cardinality to the Non-Complete Package,
then you’ll be tying it to very strong conditions of logical omniscience—and
consequently you’ll need to face up to the empirical and intuitive evidence that
ordinary agents just aren’t that good at classical logic.
Could we instead take the third route, and argue that ordinary agents whose
comparative confidences don’t satisfy the Non-Complete Package cannot
have beliefs which carry ratio and interval information? This doesn’t strike me
as very plausible. For example, the literature on the conjunction and disjunction
fallacies already strongly suggests that ordinary agents do not have comparative
confidences that respect even relatively simple bits of classical logic. So imagine
that α has just committed the conjunction fallacy—she thinks it’s more plausible
that Linda is a bank teller (B) and active in the feminist movement (F ) than
that she’s a bank teller. Are we going to say now that there’s no meaningful way
to answer the question of how much more α believes B∩F over B? Of course not.
Similarly, I am not logically omniscient, and (like most people) I’ve probably
fallen foul of various probabilistic fallacies before. My comparative confidences
don’t satisfy the Non-Complete Package. Maybe they don’t even come close
to satisfying those axioms. None of this prevents me from believing some things
much more than other things, or at least twice as much as other things.
Our capacity to believe one proposition much more than another, or (at
least) twice as much as another thing, etc., is not hostage to any presupposition
of logical coherence, still less should it depend on a condition of probabilistic
representability. Most philosophers will see no inconsistencies at all in holding
both that (a) ordinary agents’ beliefs cannot be faithfully represented by (a
set of) probability functions, and (b) for arbitrary P and Q, an ordinary agent
might believe P much more than Q, or (at least) twice as much as Q. These
claims should be uncontroversial—only someone caught firmly in the grips of a
deeply unrealistic picture of belief would think to deny it. Or at least I’ll say
this: if you want to argue otherwise, then you’ll be facing a difficult uphill battle.
Better, I think, to seek more general axioms under which cardinal information
can be extracted from a system of comparative confidences.
5. The Ramseyan Alternatives
What I’m calling Ramseyan comparativism is inspired by a brief remark from
Frank Ramsey in ‘Probability and Partial Belief’: “Well, I believe it to an extent
2/3’, i.e. (this at least is the most natural interpretation) ‘I have the same degree
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of belief in it as in P ∨ Q when I think P,Q,R equally likely and know that
exactly one of them is true’.’ (Ramsey 1929, 256.) In a recent paper, Weather-
son (2016, pp. 223–4) has also suggested that Ramsey’s remark points towards a
version of comparativism that’s weaker than probabilistic comparativism. How-
ever, neither Ramsey nor Weatherson take their discussion beyond this initial
suggestion, and (as we’ll soon see) there’s a bit of work that needs to be done
in order to flesh the idea out in full.
In the remainder of this paper, I will develop precise Ramseyan compara-
tivism (§§5.1–5.2), and then an imprecise version (§5.3). Following that, I will
prove an important result about the axioms under which Ramseyan compara-
tivism supports the analogy with the measurement of mass (§5.4).
5.1 The Main Ideas
First, it’ll be useful to introduce another definition (the term ‘n-scale’ comes
from Koopman 1940):
Definition 4. A set P of n pseudodisjoint propositions is an n-scale of P iff
(i) P /∈ P, (ii) ⋃P ∼ P , and (iii) for all Q,Q′ in P, Q ∼ Q′
We can take this as a comparativist characterisation of what it is for an agent
to think that Q is as likely as a disjunction of equiprobable propositions at most
one of which is true. So, e.g., if α thinks Q is as likely as P ∪ P ′, where P and
P ′ are equiprobable and pseudodisjoint, then {P, P ′} is a 2-scale of Q. We’ll
also assume that α is certain of P ’s truth just in case P is maximal, and we’ll
represent certainty in P with Cr(P ) = 1. This is something the Ramseyan view
shares with probabilistic comparativism, where in order to fix the scales the
values of the minimal and maximal propositions need to be stipulated.
In light of Definition 4, Ramsey’s idea can be recast as: α believes P to
degree n/m when P ∼ (Q1 ∪ · · · ∪ Qn), where the Q1, . . . , Qn belong to an m-
scale {Q1, . . . , Qn, . . . , Qm} of some maximal proposition R. A good start—but
there’s a natural extension that will be helpful to incorporate into what follows.
Consider, to begin with, the following situation. Let B designate the pow-
erset of Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, and let P〈n〉 and P〈nm〉 designate the possible worlds
propositions {ωn} and {ωn, ωm} respectively. (For example, P〈12〉 = {ω1, ω2}.)
Suppose now that % is transitive and reflexive, and (where the square brackets
indicate equiprobability):
Ω 
[
P〈13〉
P〈23〉
]

[
P〈12〉
P〈3〉
]

[
P〈1〉
P〈2〉
]
 ∅
We can represent % with Figure 1, where the relative sizes of the boxes contain-
ing the ωi correspond to the order of propositions in the confidence ranking:
ω1 ω2
ω3
Figure 1: Indirect R-scalability
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Now Ω is maximal, and {P〈12〉, P〈3〉} is a 2-scale of Ω, so Ramsey would say that
Cr(P〈3〉) = Cr(P〈12〉) = 1/2
However, P〈1〉 and P〈2〉 don’t belong to any n-scale of Ω, so Ramsey’s idea doesn’t
yet give us any strength with which they’re believed. But since {P〈1〉, P〈2〉} is a
2-scale of P〈12〉, it’s only reasonable to say that
Cr(P〈1〉) = Cr(P〈2〉) = 1/4
We can capture the foregoing by means of the following:
Definition 5. For integers n,m such that m ≥ n ≥ 0, m > 0, P is
1. 0/m-valued if P is minimal and m/m-valued if P is maximal, and
2. n/m-valued if P ∼ (Q1 ∪ · · · ∪Qn′), where the Q1, . . . , Qn′ belong to an
m′-scale of an n′′/m′′-valued proposition, and n′ · n′′/m′ ·m′′ = n/m
The new, generalised version of Ramsey’s idea now amounts to the claim that α
believes P to degree n/m if P is n/m-valued. As such, define a Ramsey function
as follows:
Definition 6. Cr : B 7→ [0, 1] is a Ramsey function (relative to %) iff, for all
P ∈ B, if P is n/m-valued, then Cr(P ) = n/m
The close connection between Ramsey functions and the GRP should at this
point be apparent, and it should likewise already be clear that the way Ramsey
proposes to measure degrees of belief isn’t too different from the strategy the
probabilistic comparativists want to adopt. In fact, in the present terminology,
the first (non-inductive) clause of the GRP essentially states that for m ≥ n, P
is believed n/m times as much as Q whenever P is an m-scale of Q, and P′ ⊆ P is
an n-scale of P . In this case, for any Ramsey function Cr, Cr(P ) = n/m · Cr(Q).
With respect to n/m-valued propositions, Ramsey functions always confirm the
GRP.
Essentially, a Ramsey function either directly or indirectly scales every mid-
dling n/m-valued proposition relative to some maximal proposition, which has a
stipulated value. With respect to pairs of propositions that cannot be so scaled,
however, a Ramsey function may disconfirm the GRP. An especially clear ex-
ample where this would occur can be seen in Figure 2:
ω1
ω2
ω3
Figure 2: Failure of R-scalability
Where
Ω  P〈23〉 
[
P〈12〉
P〈13〉
]

[
P〈2〉
P〈3〉
]
 P〈1〉  ∅
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In this case, the only non-trivial n-scale is the 2-scale {P〈2〉, P〈3〉} of P〈23〉.
According to the GRP, then, we should be able to say:
Cr(P〈2〉) = Cr(P〈3〉) = 1/2 · Cr(P〈23〉)
However, since P〈23〉 can’t be scaled relative to Ω, Ramsey’s suggestion gives us
no means of fixing values for P〈2〉, P〈3〉 and P〈23〉.
Call any proposition that’s n/m-valued R-scalable. All of the propositions
other than Ω and ∅ in Figure 2 are not R-scalable. Ramsey says nothing about
how to measure propositions that aren’t R-scalable—though perhaps this is not
a very troubling gap in his proposal. One might simply assume that such cases
don’t exist. Let N designate the set of R-scalable propositions, then:
R-Scalability. N = B
R-Scalability is not implied by the Complete Package. However, given
that package, it is equivalent to Continuity. (See the appendix for a proof.)10
In other words, precise probabilistic comparativists don’t seem to have anything
to fear from an axiom like R-Scalability. (Nevertheless, I’ll discuss below how
the Ramseyan comparativist can do without it.)
R-Scalability merely guarantees that every proposition in B is R-scalable.
Importantly, this isn’t yet enough to ground a minimally plausible comparativist
theory. There are still two additional problems that can arise in the absence of
further assumptions about the structure of %:
1. We need to ensure that Definition 6 is consistent. Without further as-
sumptions, it’s possible that, e.g., P ∼ Q, where for some R, P belongs
to a 2-scale of R and Q belongs to a 3-scale of R. This is clearly unac-
ceptable: α can’t believe P to the degrees 1/2 and 1/3 simultaneously! If
Ramsey functions are to be well-defined, we’ll need to ensure that if P is
both n/m-valued and n′/m′-valued, then n/m = n′/m′.
2. We need to ensure that any Ramsey function relative to % will agree with
%. Without further assumptions, there’s no guarantee that Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q)
if or only if P % Q. For instance, P could be 1/2-valued, and Q 1/4-valued,
yet Q % P . This is also undesirable: if the order of the values we assign
propositions don’t match up to the confidence ranking, then there can be
no plausible sense in which those values are a measure of the strengths
with which those propositions are believed.
In the presence of R-Scalability, we can kill these two birds with a single
stone by adding the following rather strong axiom:
R-Coherence. If P is n/m-valued and Q is n′/m′-valued, P % Q iff n/m ≥ n′/m′
R-Coherence is sufficient to avoid both worries, as established by the following
representation theorem:
Theorem 1. (i) % satisfies R-Coherence iff there exists a Ramsey function
Cr with respect to %, and (ii) % also satisfies R-Scalability iff Cr is the
unique Ramsey function relative to % that agrees with %.
The proofs for this theorem and the two that follow below can be found in the
appendix.
10 The proof rests in part on the assumption that B is closed under unions. Without that
assumption, Continuity will imply R-Scalability but not vice versa.
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5.2 Precise Ramseyan Comparativism
We will say from now on that one accepts precise Ramseyan comparativism just
in case they accept the following conditional:
Precise Ramseyan Comparativism. If Cr is the only Ramsey function rel-
ative to α’s confidence ranking, then Cr is a fully adequate model of α’s
beliefs
We can now characterise precisely the respects in which precise Ramseyan com-
parativism is more lenient than probabilistic comparativism. To start with, it’s
easy to see that R-Coherence is implied already by the Complete Pack-
age. Indeed, if any probability function Cr agrees with %, then Cr is also a
Ramsey function relative to %. Moreover, where the Complete Package plus
R-Scalability holds, then the unique probability function that agrees with
% just is the unique Ramsey function that agrees with %. This is important,
since (in light of what we said earlier) it means that precise Ramseyan compar-
ativism is a generalisation of any version of precise probabilistic comparativism
that makes use of Continuity.
In the other direction, R-Scalability and R-Coherence together obvi-
ously imply Completeness and Preorder. However, they don’t imply any
of Non-Triviality, Non-Negativity, or Scott’s Axiom. For a simple (al-
beit extreme) example where all three of those axioms fail, assume that Ω =
{w1, w2, w3, w4}, % is transitive and reflexive, and:
P〈4〉
P〈24〉
P〈124〉
P〈234〉
 

∅
Ω
P〈23〉
P〈34〉
 
 P〈2〉P〈14〉
P〈123〉
 

P〈1〉
P〈3〉
P〈12〉
P〈13〉
P〈134〉

It’s straightforward (albeit a little tedious) to check that R-Scalability and R-
Coherence are satisfied in this case. The only non-trivial n-scales (i.e., n > 1)
that can be defined using this ranking are:
1. The 2-scale {P〈23〉, P〈34〉} of the maximal propositions
2. The 2-scale {P〈123〉, P〈14〉} of ∅, Ω, P〈23〉, and P〈34〉
3. The several n-scales composed out of minimal propositions, each of some
other minimal proposition
Consequently, Cr(Ω) = Cr(∅) = 1/2 because {Ω} and {∅} are 1-scales of P〈23〉
and P〈34〉, where the latter are 1/2-valued; and Cr(P〈2〉) = 1/4, because {P〈2〉}
is a 1-scale of P〈14〉 and P〈123〉, where the latter are 1/4-valued. Every other
proposition is either maximal or minimal, and assigned either 1 or 0 accordingly.
That the example violates Non-Triviality, Non-Negativity is obvious; to
see that it violates Scott’s Axiom it suffices to consider the two short sequences
P〈13〉, P〈24〉 and P〈12〉, P〈34〉.
The interesting ‘work’ here is of course being done entirely byR-Coherence.
This axiom imposes a limited kind of additive structure on %, specifically with
respect to confidence rankings between propositions constructed out of mem-
bers of the same n-scale of any n′/m′-valued proposition. Roughly: within an
n-scale, % behaves “pseudo-probabilistically”—but not every proposition is con-
structible out of the members of an appropriate n-scale, and across n-scales %
can behave quite irrationally indeed.
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5.3 Imprecise Ramseyan comparativism
If we wanted to drop R-Scalability out of the picture, we could do so by
adopting a set-of-functions representation of %. For that, we will need to add
back in the Preorder axiom. This is obviously necessary for any real-valued
function or set thereof to agree with %, and it is not implied by R-Coherence
alone.
Theorem 2. % satisfies Preorder and R-Coherence iff there is a nonempty
set F of Ramsey functions relative to % such that F agrees with %, and in
such cases there will also be a unique such F that agrees with % that’s max-
imal with respect to inclusion.
Given this, let’s characterise the imprecise variety of Ramseyan compara-
tivism by its commitment to:
Imprecise Ramseyan Comparativism. If F is a non-empty set of Ramsey
functions with respect to α’s confidence ranking, which is maximal with
respect to inclusion and agrees with %, then F is an R-to-L adequate model
of α’s beliefs
Note that imprecise Ramseyan comparativism only claims R-to-L adequacy.
This is because (as we’ve seen) Preorder and R-Coherence are not suf-
ficient for a (set of) Ramsey function(s) to confirm the GRP in full. This is
a limitation with the imprecise Ramseyan comparativist’s theory, but perhaps
not a devastating one. In effect, R-to-L adequacy says that we won’t go wrong
whenever we read cardinal information off of the numbers, though there may
be some interesting cardinal properties to one’s degrees of belief that aren’t ap-
propriately captured by their cardinal representation. Although it’s not perfect,
I suspect that many comparativists would be satisfied by this result—nobody
said that our numerical representations had to be perfect after all.
Imprecise Ramseyan comparativism also agrees exactly with (precise and
imprecise) probabilistic comparativism whenever the Complete Package plus
R-Scalability are satisfied. We’ve already shown that this is so for precise
Ramseyan comparativism, but if this is not obvious in the case of imprecise
Ramseyan comparativism then consider: if we assume the Complete Package
plus R-Scalability, then the probability function Cr that agrees with % is the
Ramsey function that agrees with %; from imprecise Ramseyan comparativism,
Cr is R-to-L adequate, so Cr determines a unique ratio comparison for every
pair of non-minimal propositions; and finally, α cannot believe P n/m times as
much as Q and n′/m′ as much as Q, for n/m 6= n′/m′.
5.4 The importance of R-Coherence
Importantly, we can show that Preorder and R-Coherence are individually
necessary for coherence with the GRP.
As far as Preorder is concerned, this is obvious for the reasons already
mentioned. The more interesting result concerns R-Coherence. Given some
very minimal scaling assumptions, violations of that axiom imply that any Cr
that agrees with % cannot confirm the GRP:
Theorem 3. If (i) Cr agrees with %, (ii) there are P,Q such that P  Q, and
(iii) Cr(R) = 0 whenever R is minimal, then Cr confirms the GRP only if
R-Coherence is satisfied.
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Corollary: under the same assumptions, mutatis mutandis, any set of real-valued
functions F will confirm the GRP only if R-Coherence is satisfied.
In other words, assuming just that % has some non-trivial structure, and
that minimal propositions can be assigned value 0, that a function (or set of
functions) confirms the GRP implies that any comparative ranking it agrees with
will satisfy Preorder and R-Coherence. Thus we have found two minimal
axioms necessary for the union of pseudodisjoint sets to behave like addition
with respect to %.
6. Conclusion
Let’s take stock. The standard comparativist strategy for explaining cardinality
is based on a purported analogy with the measurement of certain extensive quan-
tities like length or mass. So, for instance, to say that P is n times more likely
than Q, we just need to be able to say that P is as likely as the union of n ‘du-
plicates’ of Q, where the ‘duplicates’ are propositions that are equiprobable and
pairwise (pseudo)disjoint. The two Ramseyan varieties of comparativism I’ve
outlined offer an account of when this kind of ‘adding’ is meaningful that gen-
eralises the axioms assumed by the more common probabilistic comparativism,
thus applying to a wide range of confidence rankings that aren’t probabilistically
representable.
In particular, we’ve shown that comparativists can in principle do with-
out any appeal to Non-Triviality, Non-Negativity, and Scott’s Axiom,
and can avoid the problems that those axioms bring in their wake. This is
an interesting result by itself, since it establishes that comparativists can pre-
serve their favourite explanation of cardinality without necessarily committing
to the stronger conditions required for probabilistic representability. Moreover,
we have been able to show that the union of (pseudo)disjoint sets behaves like
addition only if the comparative confidence ranking satisfies Preorder and R-
Coherence. Inasmuch as comparativists want to retain the analogy with the
measurement and mass as it’s usually understood—i.e., in terms of the union of
either disjoint or pseudodisjoint propositions—then Ramseyan comparativism
is as general as it gets.
It remains to be seen whether it’s correct to say that an agent α considers P
to be n times more likely than Q if and only if P is as likely for her as the union
of n pseudodisjoint duplicates of Q. But we now know the minimal conditions
required for the analogy with mass to hold, so we can ask: (a) are Preorder
and R-Coherence plausibly satisfied by actual agents—or at least, by the
kinds of agents whom we are happy to say have degrees of belief which carry
cardinal information? And, (b) if so, does the GRP in those cases accurately
predict our considered judgements about the degrees of belief of such agents?
These are questions that I’ve not considered in this paper, but they will need
careful consideration in future discussions on the viability of the comparativist
view.11
11 Thanks are due to Nick DiBella, Daniel Elstein, Alan Ha´jek, Jessica Isserow, James Joyce,
Le´a Salje, Jack Woods, and anonymous referees for discussions and comments on drafts.
Thanks are also due to audiences at the Australian National University, the University of
Leeds, and the 2018 FEW. This project has received funding from the European Union’s
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Sk lodowska-Curie grant
agreement No 703959.
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Appendix
A. Proof that, given the Complete Package, Continuity is equivalent to
R-Scalability:
Assume the Complete Package throughout. For the left-to-right, assume
Continuity. This entails that for every middling proposition P , P ∼ (Q1 ∪
· · · ∪ Qn), where the Q1, . . . , Qn belong to some m-scale of Ω, which gives us
R-Scalability.
For the right-to-left, assume R-Scalability, and (for reductio) that there
exists a non-minimal atom A in the algebra B such that for every other atom
A′, A′ % A, with ‘%’ replaced by ‘’ in at least one instance. (Equivalently:
assume there are non-minimal atoms not equally ranked by %).
Since Ω \ A is middling, it’s R-scalable only if (Ω \ A) ∼ (Q1 ∪ · · · ∪ Qn),
for some Q1, . . . , Qn in an m-scale of some R-scalable proposition S such that
S  (Ω \ A). (We can safely ignore the case where S ∼ (Ω \ A), since then S
will be R-scalable only if Ω \A is.) However, let Cr be any probability function
that agrees with %; then
Cr(Q1) + · · ·+ Cr(Qn) = Cr(Ω)− Cr(A)
Furthermore, the Qi must be more probable than A, since as there exist atoms
more probable than A the union of any and all propositions that are as probable
as A will be strictly less probable than Ω \A. So, Cr(Qi) > Cr(A), and thus
Cr(Q1) + · · ·+ Cr(Qn) + · · ·+ Cr(Qm) > Cr(Ω)
But there’s no S  Ω, so Ω \A is not R-scalable, contradicting our assumption.
R-Scalability therefore implies that A ∼ A′ for any two non-minimal atoms
A and A′; from this, Continuity straightforwardly follows.
B. Proof of Theorem 1:
Part (i): For the left-to-right, assume R-Coherence. If P is n/m-valued and
n′/m′-valued, then n/m = n′/m′. So there exists a function Cr that assigns to
each P ∈N a unique rational value in [0, 1], and Cr will be a Ramsey-function
relative to % on N. This function can then be extended to the whole of B in
the event that B−N 6= ∅ in any way you like. The right-to-left is obvious.
Part (ii): For the left-to-right, assume R-Coherence and R-Scalability.
For any P,Q ∈ N (= B), suppose first that P % Q. Where P is n/m-valued
and Q is n′/m′-valued, n/m ≥ n′/m′; so for any Ramsey-function Cr relative to %,
Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q). Next, suppose Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q); since Cr is a Ramsey function,
P is n/m-valued and Q is n′/m′-valued, for n/m ≥ n′/m′; by R-Coherence, there-
fore P % Q. So from R-Coherence and R-Scalability, there is a Ramsey-
function Cr relative to % that agrees with %. It is obvious from the definitions
that the restriction of Cr to N will always be the unique Ramsey function rela-
tive to % on N, and in this case N = B.
For the right-to-left, the existence of the Ramsey-function Cr already en-
tails R-Coherence by part (i). That its uniqueness condition also entails R-
Scalability is obvious given the finitude of B.
C. Proof of Theorem 2:
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The right-to-left of the existence part is obvious given part (i) of Theorem 1.
For the left-to-right of the existence part, assume henceforth Preorder
and R-Coherence. We focus on the case where N ⊂ B, as R-Scalability
trivialises the proof.
From Preorder, at least one nonempty set F = {fi : B 7→ R | i = 1, . . . , n}
exists that agrees with %. (See Evren and Ok 2011, p. 556, Proposition 1.)
Suppose that F is maximal with respect to inclusion. We then just need that
there’s some nonempty F∗ ⊆ F such that F∗ also agrees with % and ∀f ∈ F∗,
f has an order-preserving transformation f ′ that’s a Ramsey function w.r.t.
%. (We’ll say that f ′ is an order-preserving transformation of f just in case
f(P ) ≥ f(Q) iff f ′(P ) ≥ f ′(Q).) The set of all such transformations f ′ will then
agree with %.
There are three cases to consider: (i) N is empty; (ii) N contains only the
minimal and/or maximal elements of B; (iii) N contains some middling propo-
sitions. The first two are straightforward and omitted. For the third, note that
if F agrees with % and P  Q, then
1. f(P ) ≥ f(Q) for all f ∈ F
2. f(P ) > f(Q) for some, but not all, f ∈ F
For P,Q ∈ N, R-Coherence requires however that for any Ramsey function
Cr, if P  Q, then Cr(P ) > Cr(Q); consequently, it’s not true that if F agrees
with %, then every f ∈ F has an order-preserving transformation that’s also a
Ramsey function with respect to %. But define F∗ as follows:
F? = {f ∈ F | if P,Q ∈ N and P  Q, then f(P ) > f(Q)}
F? will be non-empty, and will agree with %. Let FN denote the set of restric-
tions of every f ∈ F? to N; given this, the unique Ramsey function (denoted
CrN) on N is going to be an order-preserving transformation of every f ∈ FN .
So we just have to show that each f ∈ F? has an order-preserving transforma-
tion bounded by 0 and 1 that’s an extension of CrN from N to the whole of B.
Since B is finite this is straightforward.
The proof of the uniqueness condition is obvious: if F and F′ both agree
with %, then F ∪F′ will too.
D. Proof of Theorem 3:
Suppose just that Cr agrees with % and that % violates R-Coherence. So,
there exist P,Q such that P is n/m-valued, Q is n′/m′-valued, and not:
(P % Q)↔ (n/m ≥ n′/m′)
There are three cases: (1) neither P nor Q is minimal; (2) both P and Q are
minimal; or (3) exactly one of P or Q is minimal.
Start with case (1). Focus on P , and let max designate some maximal propo-
sition. (If P is n/m-valued and non-minimal, then max exists.) P is either (i) as
probable as the union of n members of an m-scale of max , or (ii) as probable
as the union of n′′ members of an m′′-scale of . . . the union of n′′′ members of
an m′′′-scale of max . If (i), Cr confirms the GRP only if
Cr(P ) = n/m · Cr(max )
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If (ii), only if
Cr(P ) = (n′′ · · · · · n′′′)/(m′′ · · · · ·m′′′) · Cr(max ) = n/m · Cr(max )
The same applies to Q, mutatis mutandis, so Cr confirms the GRP only if
Cr(Q) = n′/m′ · Cr(max )
Assume for reductio that Cr confirms the GRP, and suppose n/m ≥ n′/m′. Hence,
Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q), and therefore P % Q. In the other direction, suppose P % Q;
so Cr(P ) ≥ Cr(Q), and n/m ≥ n′/m′. So,
(P % Q)↔ (n/m ≥ n′/m′),
which violates our assumptions.
Now case (2). Assume for this case that there are P,Q ∈ B such that P  Q,
and that if P is minimal, then Cr(P ) = 0. If P,Q are both minimal then P ∼ Q,
and if Cr agrees with% then Cr(P ) = Cr(Q) > Cr(R), for anyR such thatR 6∼ P
(and hence R  P ). Since P,Q are 0/m-valued by definition, R-Coherence is
violated only if P or Q is also n/m-valued, for n > 0. Suppose this of P ; then
by the earlier reasoning, Cr confirms the GRP only if Cr(P ) = n/m · Cr(max ).
Since n/m > 0 and Cr(max ) > 0, this is false; so Cr disconfirms the GRP.
Case (3) is then straightforward, and the proof of the corollary (for sets of
functions) follows the same structure. Both proofs are omitted.
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